INTRODUCTION
In Singh v Commonwealth ('Singh'), 1 the High Court was presented with the question whether a person born in Australia can be considered an 'alien' for the purpose of s 51(xix) of the Constitution ('naturalization and aliens'). In a 5:2 decision the Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that birth in Australia necessarily accorded her the status of non-alien and thus a constitutional nationality which could not be displaced by legislative reliance on other heads of power. The decision is important, both for its elucidation of Parliament's scope to regulate Australian citizenship -the subject of a series of important cases over the last two decades involving strong dissents and two reversals in approach 2 -and for its consideration of principles of constitutional interpretation.
Central to the decision in Singh was the extent to which the Commonwealth Parliament's power to pass laws with respect to a status such as 'alien' includes the power to define that status. That is, in the present context, if the constitutional status 'alien' is merely the antonym of citizen -itself a statutory concept -Parliament is essentially able to define the extent of its power. Such an outcome is of course inconsistent with established doctrines of constitutional interpretation; 3 indeed, with the very notion that the Constitution (interpreted by the High Court) defines Parliament's power. However, delimiting the constitutional scope of legislative powers _____________________________________________________________________________________ * BComm (Hons) LLB (UNSW), LLM SJD (Michigan), Senior Lecturer, University of Melbourne. I am grateful for the comments of Kim Rubenstein, Simon Evans, Graeme Hill and the anonymous reviewer for the Federal Law Review on an earlier draft of this paper. some uncertainty as to whether the plaintiff was a citizen of India, 7 the other judges proceeded on the basis that she was a citizen of India by descent. 8 Despite her birth and continuous residence from birth in Australia, Singh was not eligible to apply for Australian citizenship pursuant to the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) because she was unable to satisfy either of the requisite conditions, namely that one of her parents was at the time of her birth an Australian citizen or permanent resident, or that she had been ordinarily resident in Australia for a period of ten years. 9 It is important to note that while birth in Australia had previously been sufficient to attract Australian citizenship, 10 the Australian Citizenship Act was amended in 1986 to prevent 'migration laws [from being] circumvented through the acquisition of Australian Citizenship status by children born in Australia to temporary or illegal entrants.' 11 As a consequence Singh was a non-citizen of Australia. Since she had no substantive visa (her parents' application for a protection visa having been rejected), she was liable to removal from Australia under s 198 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) as an 'unlawful non-citizen'.
The plaintiff filed a writ of summons in the High Court seeking a declaration that, inter alia, s 198 of the Migration Act was incapable of being validly applied to her. 12 The key issue was whether s 198, in its application to the plaintiff, was validly made pursuant to the power to make laws with respect to 'naturalization and aliens' (Australian Constitution s 51(xix)). The plaintiff contended that, by virtue of her birth in Australia, she was not an alien within the meaning of s 51(xix). Kirby J subsequently stated a case for the consideration of the Full Court. The (amended) questions for consideration were (relevantly) as follows: empower the Parliament to make laws with respect to citizenship. 15 Indeed, the only reference to the concept of 'citizen' in the Constitution appears in s 44(i), which provides that a citizen of a foreign power is incapable of standing for Parliament. Rather, phrases such as 'people of the Commonwealth' 16 and 'subject of the Queen' 17 are engaged, reflecting (particularly in the case of the latter phrase) the 'political realities' at federation. 18 As a consequence, the concept of citizenship in Australian law is a purely statutory one, having been introduced in 1948. 19 In light of this, the primary issue for the judges in Singh was not whether Singh was a 'citizen' of Australia (she was clearly not a citizen within the Australian Citizenship Act), but rather whether she held the constitutional status of non-alien, thus taking her outside the purview of the aliens power.
As the majority of the Court answered 'Yes' to question 1, it was unnecessary for the majority judgments to consider other possible heads of power (such as 'immigration and emigration' 20 or 'external affairs' 21 ) which may have authorized s 198 in its application to the plaintiff. However, having found that the legislation could not be upheld under s 51(xix), McHugh and Callinan JJ in (separate) dissenting judgments necessarily had to consider the relevance of other heads of power, which raised the broader question not only of whether Singh was a non-alien but whether she was entitled to some kind of constitutional nationality which was unable to be displaced by otherwise relevant heads of power.
III THE JUDGMENTS IN SINGH
The principal argument of the plaintiff was that both the Convention Debates and common law history established that, at federation, the term 'aliens' would clearly not have encompassed persons born in Australia. It was submitted that the traditional common law position that citizenship (or, more accurately, the status of 'subject of the Queen') is governed by jus soli ('right of the soil') as opposed to jus sanguinis ('right of descent') -more commonly adopted in civil law countries -was well understood by the drafters of the Australian Constitution. Australian Constitution s 51(xxvii).
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Australian Constitution s 51(xxix).
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The common law position was said to have been restated and explained in Calvin's Case (1608) 7 Co Rep 1a; 77 ER 377 in which Coke CJ 'applied the common law rule that a person cannot be a natural born subject unless the place of his or her birth, at the time of his or her
Crown were British subjects and that all those born within the sovereign's territory owed allegiance to the Crown. 23 The plaintiff argued that the Australian Constitution 'preserves the reciprocal relationship between the Queen of Australia and the people of the Commonwealth who owe her allegiance', and thus Parliament cannot legislate to remove this constitutional nationality. 24 Indeed, the plaintiff contended that the Convention Debates reveal that a key reason for declining to confer legislative power on the Commonwealth with respect to citizenship was the concern that Parliament might use this power to remove the common law 'birthright' of those born on Australian soil. The Commonwealth disputed the usefulness of the Convention Debates in resolving the precise issue before the Court, and also cast doubt upon the clarity of the common law position at federation. In particular, the Commonwealth pointed to 19 th century legislative changes which suggested that the traditional British preference for jus soli had undergone significant amendments prior to federation. These changes in part reflected even more dramatic developments in the citizenship laws of European states throughout the 19 th century, which had produced the result that while citizenship by birth (jus soli) was the general rule at the beginning of the 19 th century, the rule of descent or blood (jus sanguinis) was the 'leading principle in Europe' by the turn of the 20 th century. 25 In oral argument significance was also placed on the correct approach to constitutional interpretation. The plaintiff engaged the Convention Debates and common law history in support of a position that essentially established a fixed meaning of 'alien' in 1900, thereby restricting Parliament's powers and providing a broad scope of protection for non-statutory citizens who can be categorized as nonaliens. By contrast, the Commonwealth emphasized the contemporary circumstances (ease of air travel, globalization) 26 which support the need for a broad view of Parliament's power to formulate appropriate citizenship laws for Australia. 27 Whether or not this difference in interpretative approach was ultimately determinative will be considered below.
The majority judgments
Gleeson CJ began by setting out his Honour's previously expressed view that ss 51(xix) and (xxvii) ('immigration and emigration') of the Constitution authorize the Parliament to 'create and define the concept of Australian citizenship, to prescribe the conditions on which such citizenship may be acquired or lost, and to link citizenship with the How then did Gleeson CJ reach the conclusion that Singh was properly considered an alien? Responding to the plaintiff's arguments regarding historical materials, Gleeson CJ found that contrary to the unified and clear picture of the state of the common law depicted by the plaintiff, in 1900 'questions of nationality, allegiance and alienage were matters on which there were changing and developing policies, and which were seen as appropriate for parliamentary resolution'. 32 That is, while jus soli had been the governing approach for centuries, the British Parliament had intervened in the latter half of the 19 th century to amend this position in 'significant respects '. 33 Given that the law was in a state of flux at the time of drafting, the legal context did 'not support or require a conclusion that "aliens"…excludes the plaintiff.' 34 Turning to the Convention Debates, Gleeson CJ noted that in 1898 Dr Quick had proposed that the delegates either insert a definition of citizenship in the draft Bill or confer a power on the Parliament to define citizenship. After reviewing the Debates, his Honour concluded that they were not able to throw light on the purpose or object of s 51(xix), since it is impossible to discern any specific reason for the rejection of Quick's 'ambiguous proposal concerning citizenship.' 35 As a result, the plaintiff's argument was not made out. Their Honours derived the key criterion of owing 'allegiance to a foreign state' by reference to pre-federation history. This historical assessment revealed that, as Gleeson CJ had found, by the end of the 19 th century the word 'aliens' no longer had the fixed legal meaning established in Calvin's Case in 1608. However, what did remain unaltered, according to the joint judgment, was that 'aliens' included 'those who owed allegiance to another sovereign power, or who, having no nationality, owed no allegiance to a sovereign power.' 37 This was said to focus correctly on what characteristic or element gives a person the status of 'alien', namely, owing obligations to another sovereign power, rather than seeking to define the status descriptively by reference only to the list of persons to whom it applied in 1900. 38 Or, to use terminology engaged in previous jurisprudence, the joint judgment sought to identify the connotation of the word 'alien' by reference to its central characteristic. 39 The joint judgment rather cursorily dismissed dicta from previous High Court authority, particularly the early decision of Potter v Minahan, in which the Court had stated that 'every person becomes at birth a member of the community into which he is born, and is entitled to remain in it until excluded by some competent authority'. 40 This and other more recent dicta relied upon by McHugh J in dissent, 41 which appear to assume that birth in Australia takes a person outside the aliens power, were said not to be binding since none of those cases concerned the precise issue before the Court in Singh. 42 The final majority judge, Kirby J, departed from the other majority judgments with respect to the question of constitutional interpretation in that his Honour eschewed reliance on historical materials (including both common law and the Convention Debates) as supporting the ossification of the constitutional meaning of 'aliens' as at 1901. 43 Rather, consistent with his well established contemporary approach to the meaning of constitutional terms, Kirby J approached the key issues on the supposition that the legislative power with respect to 'aliens' is 'capable of application to a larger, contemporary, condition of things beyond what might have been the generally accepted meaning of the word at the time of Federation'. 44 In this respect it should be noted that the joint judgment appeared to call into question the utility of engaging tools such as connotation/denotation or concepts/conceptions. Their Honours stated that while such tools might be thought useful, ' [t] here is at least a risk, however, that using such tools directs attention to their content and to their utility rather than to the analytical task they are being used to undertake': ibid 404 [161] . Honour conceded some role for consideration of the 'framers' intentions', and in this regard noted that at federation there were two primary theories -jus soli and jus sanguinis -'vying for acceptance amongst the nations of the world in 1901'. 45 Moreover, while jus soli had traditionally been the theory favoured by the common law, it had already admitted significant exceptions by 1900. Thus, Kirby J concluded that it was unconvincing that the federal Parliament 'was forever to be limited to the approach of birthright'. 46 On the contrary, according to Kirby J, a status such as alienage of its nature evolves over time, and must be capable of responding to contemporary challenges such as the impact of aviation and other modes of rapid transport that 'make possible, in ways unthinkable in 1901, adventitious arrivals of parents, with confinement and birth arranged within the receiving country'. 47 Despite envisaging a wide scope for legislative power pursuant to 'naturalization and aliens', Kirby J was careful to reserve the ability of the Court to impose limits on Parliament's power so as to guard against future abuse of the 'aliens' power. However, like Gleeson CJ, his Honour did not attempt to delimit the power or provide content to the meaning of 'alien' by reference to defining factors or characteristics. Rather, Kirby J emphasized that 'this court can be trusted to draw the necessary constitutional line' if Parliament attempts 'to push the "aliens" power into extreme circumstances'. 48 In this case, the operation of the law on the plaintiff could not be viewed as 'extreme'; thus the plaintiff failed. While Kirby J's judgment provides some insight into the types of cases which might be considered extreme (that is, if the Parliament were to deem a person born in Australia an alien 'despite parental or grand-parental links of descent and residence' 49 ), it gives at most a descriptive list of persons who might fall outside the term 'alien', but no conceptual basis for distinguishing aliens from non-aliens.
The dissents
The most extensive and strongly worded judgment in dissent is that of McHugh J. As in the joint judgment, McHugh J's reasoning is evidenced in a (poly)syllogism: 50 An alien is a person who does not owe permanent allegiance to the Queen of Australia. A person who is born in Australia owes an obligation of permanent allegiance to the Queen of Australia. 51 Therefore, a person born in Australia is not an alien. Ms Singh was born in Australia. Therefore, Ms Singh is not an alien.
McHugh J derived the above criterion, like the joint judgment, from pre-federation sources which he relied upon to identify the connotation of 'aliens' in 1900. 52 McHugh J acknowledged that this is a result of evolution, that is, when the Crown 'divided', 'the denotation of the term "subject of the Queen" changed' so as to refer to the Queen of Australia: ibid 375 [57].
Honour surveyed the history of the status of 'subjects of the Crown' and 'aliens' respectively, from their origins in medieval common law and the feudal system, through to the restatement of the law in Calvin's Case, which established the common law rule that all persons 'born within the King's dominions' acquired the status of a natural born subject. 53 His Honour emphasized that at common law a natural born subject 'owed from birth permanent allegiance to the Crown'. 54 His Honour acknowledged the common law exceptions which had developed over time, and the legislative changes in the late 19 th century relied upon by the majority judgments, but concluded that they did not change the essential position that in 1900 persons within British dominions were either 'natural born subjects' or 'alien subjects'. 55 Thus, the 'irresistible conclusion' was that 'in 1900, those who made the Constitution understood that at common law, a person born within the dominions of the British Crown was a "natural born British subject", who owed permanent allegiance to the British Crown and was not an alien.' 56 In his Honour's view, the Convention Debates support these conclusions as they reveal that the failure to confer on the Federal Parliament power to make laws with respect to citizenship was a conscious decision of the delegates designed to protect against a future Parliament depriving 'a person of his or her citizenship -a concept that was treated as identical with "subject of the Queen"'. 57 McHugh J was particularly critical of an approach which declined to provide a definition of 'alien'. His Honour noted that Gibbs CJ's assurance, that Parliament could not expand the aliens power so as to include persons 'who could not possibly answer the description of "aliens" in the ordinary understanding of the word', 58 provides no assistance in determining the meaning of the constitutional term 'aliens'. As his Honour explained, '[t]o apply this statement, one has to know what is "the ordinary understanding of the word"… [t]hat is to say, one must have a definition of "aliens"'. 59 A significant feature of McHugh J's judgment is that it suggests that not only is a person born in Australia outside the purview of the 'aliens' power, but that such a person acquires constitutional nationality or citizenship which protects against Parliament's ability to remove or otherwise impair such citizenship by reliance on other heads of power. 60 
Federal Law Review
Volume 34 ____________________________________________________________________________________ rights, protections or liabilities might flow from recognition of this status. In other words, what would be the content of the concept of constitutional nationality? 61 The other judge in dissent, Callinan J, focused at length on the correct approach to constitutional interpretation. Taking the converse approach to Kirby J, Callinan J expounded a theory of constitutional interpretation which almost entirely restricts the exercise to one of construing 'the intentions of [its] makers objectively ascertained'. 62 Accordingly, his Honour proceeded to consider the common law history and Convention Debates, and concluded that the common law position persisting at federation was that children of foreign parents, born 'within the dominions of the Crown' 63 were British subjects, and that this was 'the contemporary legal position with which the founders were familiar'. 64 Thus, the term alien did not at federation encompass children born on Australian soil; nor had the meaning of the word altered since that time. 65 Importantly, Callinan J did not merely conclude that the plaintiff was not an alien in the constitutional sense, but went further in holding that, as a person born in Australia, she was entitled 'as of right to be regarded as a national of [Australia] , and in substance as a citizen, albeit not as a citizen for the purposes of the Citizenship Act'. 66 Thus, like McHugh J, Callinan J held that there is a status of constitutional citizen or national of Australia. Further, his Honour concluded that there seems to be 'no reason why the plaintiff should not continue to have that right unless and until she renounces it or makes an acknowledgement inconsistent with it.' 67 Whether the voluntary assumption of another nationality, for example, would suffice to constitute an 'acknowledgement inconsistent with it' is unclear.
IV ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF SINGH
A Constitutional interpretation -theory and methodology in Singh As alluded to above, principles of constitutional interpretation were considered important by all of the judgments in Singh, and in two judgments in particular differences in approach were thought to be determinative. 68 One of the key issues was the use of historical materials in interpreting constitutional terms. The Commonwealth _____________________________________________________________________________________ 61 McHugh J stated that, 'birth within Australia makes a person a member of the Australian community who comes under an obligation to obey its laws and is correlatively entitled to all the rights and benefits which membership of the community involves': ibid 398 [135] . However, it is by no means clear that this would equate a constitutional citizen to a statutory citizen, since much legislation confers particular benefits on statutory citizens only. For a description of such legislation, see Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship, above n 10, Chapter Five. questioned the appropriateness of taking into account the Convention Debates in this context, 69 which precipitated some lengthy consideration by a number of the judges about the role of the Debates (and other historical references such as the state of the common law at federation) in construing a Constitution 'intended to endure'. 70 None of the judgments took the position that historical materials, such as the Convention Debates, are irrelevant. Rather, consistent with previous authority, it was reiterated that reference to the public record of the Convention Debates may be made, 'not for the purpose of seeking the subjective intention of people involved in the drafting', 'but for the purpose of identifying the contemporary meaning of language used, the subject to which that language was directed and the nature and objectives of the movement towards federation.' 71 Even Kirby J acknowledged that '[r]egard may certainly be had to the framers' intentions'. 72 The key difference in approach was rather in respect of the extent to which the inquiry ends once the framers' (objective) intentions have been ascertained. Kirby J undoubtedly advocated a contemporary or evolutionary approach in the clearest terms. 73 However, the joint judgment, as well as those of Gleeson CJ and McHugh J, 
Federal Law Review
Volume 34 ____________________________________________________________________________________ acknowledged that consideration of historical material is not sufficient. For example, the joint judgment explained that while identifying the meaning of constitutional terms at federation is an 'essential step in the task of construction', 74 the 'task does not end with the results of that inquiry'. 75 Rather, '[a]lways, the Constitution is to be construed bearing steadily in mind that it is an instrument of government intended to endure'. 76 In fact, the only real disagreement in this regard is with respect to Callinan J's clear preference for an originalist approach and concomitant rejection of an attempt to pay deference to evolving language and contemporary meaning of constitutional terms. In his Honour's view, in practice 'substantive linguistic change occurs very slowly' and, '[w]hen change does occur, it generally tends to relate to popular culture rather than to the expression of fundamental ideas, philosophies, principles and legal concepts.' 77 Thus, judges should 'be especially vigilant to recognize and eschew what is in substance a constitutional change under a false rubric of a perceived change in the meaning of a word, or an expression used in the Constitution.' 78 More fundamentally, however, given that power to amend the Constitution 'resides exclusively in the Australian people pursuant to s 128', Callinan J questioned whether, even if there were a change in the meaning of a word or phrase, the Court can 'justify a departure from its meaning at the time of Federation.' 79 Thus, constitutional instruments 'are still basically to be construed by reference to the intentions of their makers objectively ascertained'. 80 On the basis of this outline of theoretical position, we might expect to observe quite divergent reasoning as between Callinan J on the one hand, and the remainder of the Court on the other. However what is perhaps most interesting about this apparent disagreement is the extent to which the judgments declined to implement in practice their preferred theoretical approach. In particular, despite the fact that both the joint judgment and that of McHugh J (the only two judgments to develop a criterion of 'alien') stated respectively that the 'Constitution is to be construed bearing steadily in mind that it is an instrument of government intended to endure', 81 and that the Constitution should be interpreted keeping in mind the fundamental premise that the makers 'laid down a blueprint for the government of the nation for the indefinite future'; 82 in fact both judgments rely solely on historical materials in developing their respective formulations of the key element of the term 'aliens'. 83 A number of the judgments acknowledged the feudal origins of the concept of allegiance between a subject and a sovereign power. As the joint judgment explained, the concept has its root 'in the feudal idea of a personal duty of fealty to a lord from whom land is held'. 85 It was this history which prompted Gleeson CJ to observe in oral argument that part of the disagreement in Singh, and in previous decisions of the High Court with respect to the 'aliens' power, relates 'to whether or not the concept of alienage is tied to the feudal concept of subjection to a monarch or whether it is related to questions of citizenship and membership of the community.' 86 Indeed, the joint judgment noted Gummow J's warning in a previous decision that care is required in 'treating what Holdsworth wrote of the position in England centuries ago respecting allegiance to the Crown as supplying in modern times a sufficient and adequate discrimen between subjects or citizens and aliens.' 87 Yet their Honours nonetheless concluded that, since history demonstrates that by the end of the 19 th century 'aliens' included those who owed allegiance to another sovereign power, 'allegiance to a foreign power' is today the discrimen of 'aliens' in the Australian Constitution. 88 Consideration of this historical position in light of the question whether the constitutional expression 'alien' has 'a different operation…100 years after Section 17 of the Act provided that an Australian citizen aged 18 or over who does 'any act or thing, the sole or dominant purpose of which and the effect of which is to acquire the nationality or Citizenship of a foreign country shall…cease to be an Australian citizen': ibid 60. Section 17 was repealed by the Australian Citizenship Legislation Amendment Act 2002 (Cth).
considered anachronistic'. 95 Moreover, it was acknowledged that there are many reasons why Australian citizens may wish to retain or acquire a foreign citizenship, for example for nostalgic reasons, or for practical considerations such as the existence of property rights in a foreign country, 96 none of which necessarily cast doubt on a person's commitment to or connection with Australia. 97 In light of these developments, the notion that foreign citizenship is the defining criterion of alienage for constitutional purposes does not arguably accord with modern realities. 98 An approach which focused instead on the degree of membership or connection with the Australian community might have embodied a more modern conception of citizenship (or, to be more accurate, non-alienage). 99
This was the view of the Joint Standing Committee on Migration (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Migration, Australians All: Enhancing Australian Citizenship (1994)), as cited in Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship, above n 10, 142. These criticisms also related to the fact that prior to the amendment, persons born with another citizenship but who acquired Australian citizenship could retain both nationalities; but once a person was an Australian citizen, he/she could not acquire another citizenship: see Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship, above n 10, 142.
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Australian Citizenship Council, above n 93, 61.
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As the Australian Citizenship Council stated: 'The law and practice of most countries with which Australia likes to compare itself permits citizens of those countries to obtain another citizenship without losing their original citizenship…These countries simply recognize that they have an internationally mobile population and that they can retain connection with this population even if another citizenship is acquired': ibid 65, cited by Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship, above n 10, 142. 
Federal Law Review
Volume 34 ____________________________________________________________________________________ It is also difficult to reconcile this approach with other decisions of the High Court which have considered the notion of 'allegiance' to a foreign power. In Singh, the criterion of 'allegiance to another sovereign power' was applied to the plaintiff in a fairly mechanical manner. That is, the mere fact of her Indian citizenship, conferred on her automatically at birth by operation of law, was considered sufficient by the joint judgment to establish her foreign allegiance, and thus alien status. 100 However, in Sykes v Cleary, the High Court held that the mere fact of 'continuing to possess a foreign nationality' does not disqualify an Australian citizen for election to Parliament under s 44(i) of the Constitution (notwithstanding that s 44(i) provides that a citizen of a foreign power 'shall be incapable of being chosen as a member of Parliament'), as long as that person has taken 'all reasonable steps to renounce that nationality'. 101 This implicitly assumes that the mere possession of a foreign nationality does not necessarily involve 'allegiance' to that foreign power. 102 In reaching that conclusion in Sykes, Mason CJ, Toohey and McHugh JJ interpreted s 44(i) in light of the fact that it 'finds its place in a Constitution which was enacted at a time, like the present, when a high proportion of Australians, though born overseas, had adopted this country as their home'. 103
B
Constitutional limits on the aliens power? As explained above, it is well established that there must be some limit on the Commonwealth's ability to determine the scope of its own power by deciding who falls within the status 'alien'. In Singh, the Commonwealth sought to define such limits by identifying the 'core' of the notion of alienage, or, to be more accurate, non-alienage, which would be outside Commonwealth power. 104 The argument was made that once such a 'core' could be identified, the 'penumbra' -or outer limits of the conceptwould be within Parliament's power to regulate. 105 The Commonwealth conceded in oral argument that such a core (of non-alienage) would include, 'at least people who are born in Australia to parents who are Australian _____________________________________________________________________________________ 100 As the joint judgment explained in summarizing their Honours' argument: 'As a citizen of India the plaintiff has obligations, "owes allegiance", to a nation other than Australia. She is, therefore, a person within the class referred to in s 51(xix) as "aliens"': Ibid. citizens, and it may well extend to people who are Australian permanent residents'. 106 Thus, where conditions of both jus soli and jus sanguinis are present, a person presumably 'could not possibly answer the description of "aliens"'. 107 However, as Kirby J observed in Singh, such concessions on behalf of the Commonwealth cannot 'necessarily be taken as binding future governments or parliaments'. 108 Ultimately, as explained above, the joint judgment preferred to identify the 'central characteristic' of the status alien by reference to foreign allegiance. 109 While only three of the five majority judges in Singh formulated a specific test or criterion for assessing whether a person is properly within the 'aliens' power, in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Ame ('Ame'), handed down on 4 August 2005, a joint judgment comprising six judges held that the consequence of Singh is that, 'the legal status of alienage has as its defining characteristic the owing of allegiance to a foreign sovereign power'. 110 The challenge is to ascertain how that determining characteristic assists in delimiting the scope of Parliament's power. For example, what does the central characteristic of 'foreign alienage' tell us about whether or not the Commonwealth can legislate to alter existing citizenship laws so as to provide that all persons born outside Australia (regardless of parentage) are no longer capable of obtaining citizenship? Or, to use an example which was far more troubling for a number of judges in oral argument in Singh, can Parliament legislate to denationalize all Australian-born citizens who have at least one foreign-born parent, grandparent or great grandparent? Would the answer depend on whether there was a racial element to such a policy?
If citizenship is a mere statutory benefit, then, according to existing authority, Parliament may legislate to withdraw it. 111 On the other hand, if the conferral of statutory citizenship also carries with it (either alone or in conjunction with other indicia of connection to the Australian community) conferral of the status of non-alien, and/or some kind of constitutional nationality, then Parliament's power to alter such constitutional status (by amending the Australian Citizenship Act) may be limited. This highlights the continuing importance of the question whether there is some essential/core/immutable notion of alien (and its converse non-alienage) beyond that identified in Singh. Two specific manifestations of this uncertainty, namely the categories of stateless persons and dual citizens, will first be considered, before turning to deprivation of citizenship more generally.
Stateless persons
In principle, since a stateless person does not enjoy the citizenship or nationality of any state, it is difficult to understand how such a person could be said to owe allegiance to a 'foreign sovereign power'. However it is important to note that in the joint judgment in Singh, their Honours concluded that what had remained unaltered throughout the 19 th century was that 'aliens' included those who owed allegiance to another sovereign power, 'or who, having no nationality, owed no allegiance to any sovereign power.' 112 Further, it is implicit in Kirby J's decision in Singh that a stateless person also falls within the aliens power, since, as mentioned above, his Honour found that it was unclear that Singh had in fact acquired Indian citizenship. 113 Notwithstanding this, it is still open to question whether Singh, on its proper reading, can be said to foreclose an argument that a stateless person born in Australia is outside the scope of the aliens power. The joint judgment in Singh sought to establish 'what it is that gives a person the status' of alien, and in doing so, emphasized repeatedly that what gives a person that status is 'owing obligations to another sovereign power'. 114 As explained above, this essential characteristic was largely derived from historical analysis which revealed that, by the end of the 19 th century, the one constant feature of the term 'aliens' was that 'the alien "belonged to another"'. 115 It is less clear whether historical analysis supports the view that the term also included stateless persons, particularly given that, as Gummow J noted in Al-Kateb, the phenomenon of stateless persons 'achieved significance only in the course of the twentieth century'. 116 The conclusion that the reference to stateless persons in Singh thus constitutes obiter is strengthened when one considers that the joint judgment in Ame confirmed that 'the legal status of alienage has as its defining characteristic the owing of allegiance to a foreign sovereign power.' 117 In a post-Singh decision which considered its application to stateless persons, the Full Federal Court noted that the joint judgment in Singh 'concentrated on the central notion' of foreign allegiance. 118 However, the Court took the view that there was nothing in the joint judgment in Singh contrary to the proposition that a stateless person is an alien. 119 Significantly, the Court proceeded to explain that the applicant was an alien, 'simply because, like a citizen of a foreign country, a stateless person lacks any constitutionally significant relationship with Australia'. 120 However, this appears to depart from the reasoning in Singh, since none of the majority judgments purported to define the status 'alien' by reference to a person's connection to or relationship with Australia. 121 The Full Federal Court's analysis suggests that one must identify a set of positive features that constitute the core or essential characteristics of non-alien, that is, the content of a 'constitutionally significant relationship', in order to ascertain whether a person is outside the ambit of the aliens power. The fact that the Full Federal Court adopted this approach may indicate the limitations of the 'foreign allegiance' criteria in further defining the parameters of the aliens power. The referral of Koroitamana to a Full Bench of the High Court indicates that serious questions remain concerning the application of Singh to the category of stateless persons. 122 
Dual nationals
Another uncertain category following Singh is that of dual nationals, that is, those Australian citizens who also 'owe allegiance to a foreign power'. Once an exclusive criterion (owing allegiance elsewhere) rather than an inclusive criterion (owing allegiance to Australia; membership of the Australian community) is adopted, the mere fact of foreign citizenship would appear to render a person an 'alien' within the meaning of the Constitution. Indeed, so much appears to have been confirmed by Kirby J in Ame, where his Honour noted that once the plaintiff had become a citizen of a foreign state (in that case Papua New Guinea):
in accordance with Singh, it was competent for the Australian Parliament…to provide for the termination of the applicant's statutory status of Australian citizen…It did not have to do so. It might have provided for dual citizenship (a later legal development in Australia). But as a matter of constitutional power, the legal entitlement existed. 123 The practical significance of this is that it would presumably be open to Parliament to legislate for the automatic removal of Australian citizenship of all persons who have or acquire a foreign nationality, regardless of the circumstances in which the foreign citizenship was acquired, and regardless of the individual's ability to divest himself or herself of that foreign nationality. It may be that a dual national who had a sufficient connection with Australia (for example, who was born in Australia to Australian parents) could be said to 'not possibly answer the description of alien'; 124 however this would be difficult to elicit from the reasoning in Singh.
Deprivation of statutory citizenship
The Court was presented with the opportunity to consider, in the post-Singh context, the scope of Parliament's power to withdraw statutory citizenship in Ame. The background to the case was that following the achievement of Papuan independence in 1975, the Governor-General promulgated regulations, pursuant to s 6 of the Papua New Guinea Independence Act 1975 (Cth), which provided that persons who became citizens of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea on Independence Day ceased to be Australian citizens. 125 The applicant in Ame submitted that Parliament 'lacked the legislative capacity to deprive the applicant of his Australian citizenship' in this manner. In particular, it was argued that there is a limitation inherent in s 51 (xix) 'that prevents that power from being applied unilaterally (that is, without the consent of the individual manifested by renunciation or some similar act) to change a person's status' from non-alien to alien. 126 Further, it was submitted that all Commonwealth legislative powers were constrained by a 'broader constitutional principle that prevented the Federal Parliament and the Executive Government of the Commonwealth from depriving a person such as the applicant of his fundamental constitutional status as an Australian national ("citizen")'; a status described 'by reference to the provisions in the Constitution referring to a "subject of the Queen" or the notion of the "people of the Commonwealth".' 127 The joint judgment (of six judges) focused on the asserted limitation on s 51(xix) and emphasized that this issue did not directly arise since the Court was concerned only with 'whether any such limitation exists in relation to the inhabitants of external territories', 128 that is, with s 122 of the Constitution. Thus, '[w]hat follows is to be understood in that context'. 129 Notwithstanding this caveat, however, the joint judgment immediately noted that, '[i]n any event, no limitation of the kind proposed applies to the power conferred by s 51(xix).' 130 In particular:
In Singh, a majority of the Court rejected the view that concepts of alienage and citizenship describe a bilateral relationship which is a status, alteration of which requires an act on the part of the person whose status is in issue. 131 This would appear to be at least an implicit rejection of the view expressed by Gaudron J in Taylor that the Parliament's power to deprive a person of Australian citizenship can only be exercised 'by reference to some change in the relationship between the individual and the community.' 132 It is also a clear (although not explicit) 133 rejection of the US position which holds that the constitutional guarantee of citizenship may be lost only where a person 'voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship'. 134 Justice Kirby agreed with the joint judgment in Ame as to the answers to the stated questions in that case; however, his Honour was far more troubled by the question of limits on Commonwealth power to withdraw citizenship. His Honour observed that:
The deprivation of nationality, including nationality by birth and especially in cases affecting minority ethnic communities, has been such a common affront to fundamental rights that I would not, without strong persuasion, hold it to be possible under the Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth. 135 Given the particular position of external territories in the constitutional structure, the question of Parliament's broader power to withdraw citizenship for those in internal territories, or indeed more generally, did not arise in that case. 136 However, it is clear from Kirby J's judgment that his Honour considers that there remains a concept of constitutional nationality, since his Honour emphasized that the outcome in Ame 'affords no precedent for any deprivation of constitutional nationality of other Australian citizens whose claim on such nationality is stronger in law and fact than that of the applicant.' 137 It is not clear precisely what this notion of constitutional nationality would comprise. However, the emphasis on 'law and fact' and the fact that Kirby J distinguished the 'fragile and strictly limited character of the "citizenship" of Australia which the applicant previously enjoyed' (a limited form of citizenship that did not even allow for automatic entry into Australia) from 'other circumstances of local nationality having firmer foundations ', 138 suggests that identifying the content would involve a qualitative assessment of the nature of a person's connection with Australia, including (previously enjoyed) statutory rights. Similarly, it is not clear precisely what the consequences would be of attaining such constitutional status, although some indication is provided in the reference to 'rights of due process that might arise' in cases of local nationality with former foundations. 139 Ultimately however we are left with the conclusion that while there are 'fundamental notions of nationality, sufficiently expressed or necessarily implied, in the Australian Constitution', the 'limited and special circumstances of the applicant's case do not require the refinement of such limitations.' 140
V CONCLUSION
The recent High Court decisions in Singh and Ame address two of the most fundamental questions pertaining to Australian citizenship law today. The first is the criterion for defining the status 'alien' and in particular the degree to which the Commonwealth's ability to define that status is 'at large'. 141 This case-note has argued that the formulation adopted by a majority of the Court is open to criticism on the basis that it is derived solely from historical sources without regard to its contemporary relevance, and that its practical application to various categories of persons remains uncertain and problematic. The second question is whether, assuming there is a constitutional category of non-alien, Parliament can unilaterally change a person's status from non-alien to alien. Previous authority established that Parliament alone retains the power to determine the conditions on which a person may be naturalized; in other words that a person cannot change status from alien to non-alien merely by 'absorption' into the Australian community (without undergoing a process of naturalization). 142 However, following Ame, it remains unclear whether Parliament enjoys an equally unilateral power to alter a person's status from non-alien to alien; or whether some limitations exist to circumscribe Parliament's power. While these cases
